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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VICKI J. AZNARAN and RICHARD N. AZNARAN,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY OF CALIFORNIA, et al.,

Defendants.

AND RELATED COUNTERCLAIMS.) TIME:

) CASE No. CV 88-1786 JMI(Ex)

) SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT) OF DEFENDANTS' NOTICE OF) PLAINTIFFS' NON-COMPLIANCE WITH) MANDATORY PRETRIAL PROCEDURES) AND REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS; DECLARA-) TION OF LAURIE J. BARTILSON) [F.R.C.P. 16(f), 41(b)]) [Local Rule 27.2]

To be determined) DATE: To be determined

COURTROOM: Hon. James M. Ideman

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In defendants' notice of plaintiffs' non-compliance with mandatory pretrial procedures, filed and served on August 9, 1991, defendants demonstrated that, throughout this litigation, plaintiffs have engaged in an "unswerving pattern of non-compliance and campaign of delay." [Notice of Non-Compliance at 3]. After documenting for this Court instance after instance of plaintiffs' failure to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Local Rules of this Court, and the orders of this Court, defendants requested severe and immediate sanctions against plaintiffs and their counsel. Dismissal is, of course, the most appropriate sanction as supported by the opinion of the 9th Circuit affirming dismissal by Chief Judge Real under remarkably similar circumstances in Chism v. National Heritage Life Ins. Co., 637 F.2d 1382 (9th Cir. 1981).

On the very day that defendants filed and served their notice, August 9, 1991, this Court issued the following order concerning motions then and now pending before it:

In light of the Court's inadvertantly [sic] approving Plaintiffs' substitution of counsel and the subsequent reinstating of Ford Greene as Plaintiffs' counsel, however, the Court has determined that, in fairness to the parties, some extension of time for filing opposition and replies to already pending motions is appropriate. Therefore . . . the Court hereby GRANTS Plaintiffs an extension until 3:00 p.m. on August 19, 1991 to file any opposition to any pending motions in this action. . .

[Ex. A, Order of August 9, 1991 (the "Order"), p. 2, emphasis in original].

The Court also specifically ordered that, "Counsel are hereby reminded that the 35 page limit, excluding indices and exhibits, mandated by the Local Rules apply to all submissions." [Id. at 3].

At the time that the Court issued its Order, the following motions were pending before it:

- 1. Defendants' Summary Judgment Motion Based Upon Statute of Limitations;
- Defendants' Summary Judgment Motion Based Upon First
 Amendment;
- 3. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Prejudice Caused by Yanny and Plaintiffs;
- 4. Defendants' Motion to Exclude Testimony of Plaintiffs'
 Designated Expert Margaret Singer; and
- 5. Defendants' Motion For Separate Trial of Affirmative Defenses; and
- 6. Defendants' Motion to Strike Papers Filed by Joseph Yanny.

Accordingly, plaintiffs were required to file oppositions to each of these motions by Monday, August 19, 1991 at 3:00 p.m., in the proper format, in compliance with all Local Rules, and not in excess of 35 pages, excluding exhibits. Instead, after 3:00 p.m. on August 19, 1991, plaintiffs submitted to the Court for filing:

1. An Opposition to Defendants' Summary Judgment Motion Based Upon Statute of Limitations, which is 40 pages in

length, excluding any Statement of Facts;

- 2. An Opposition to Defendants' Summary Judgment Motion Based Upon First Amendment, which is <u>50</u> pages in length, excluding any Statement of Facts;
- 3. An Ex Parte Application for permission to file the oversized memoranda, which states no grounds for the application and is not supported by any memorandum of points and authorities; and
- 4. An "Appendix of Fact" which is <u>53</u> pages in length, is not a sworn statement of any kind, and which is plainly an attempt to further circumvent this Court's order limiting the size of memoranda to be filed. This Appendix is <u>not</u> mentioned by plaintiffs in their <u>ex parte</u> application.

The oppositions are not accompanied by Statements of Genuine Issues, as required by Local Rule 7.14.2. No oppositions were filed to \underline{any} of the other pending motions.

Defendants' counsel, Laurie Bartilson, telephoned plaintiffs' counsel, Ford Greene, several times on August 19, 1991, in an effort to obtain prompt service copies of the documents which Mr. Greene was filing. After reaching first an answering machine and then a visitor to Greene's office, 1/Mr. Greene finally returned Ms. Bartilson's calls at approximately 2:00 p.m. After ascertaining that Mr.

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^{1.} The visitor to Mr. Greene's office was Gerald Armstrong, whom plaintiffs' disqualified counsel, Joseph A. Yanny, identified as a paralegal whom Yanny hired to work with him on this case. [Ex. C, Declaration of Joseph A. Yanny, July 31, 1991, para. 4; Ex. D, Declaration of Gerald Armstrong, July 19, 1991, para. 4]. Moreover, by preliminary injunction issued in Los Angeles Superior Court on August 6, 1991, Yanny is forbidden from directly or indirectly acting as counsel against defendants on behalf of the Aznarans or Gerald Armstrong. [Ex. E, Transcript of August 6, 1991, at 3-4].

Greene had indeed sent papers to the Court for filing, but had not as yet made arrangements for service, Ms. Bartilson offered to send a courier to Mr. Greene's office to pick up service copies. Mr. Greene replied that the papers were at Kinko's being copied, and would be ready between 5:00 and 6:00 p.m. [Ex. B, Declaration of Laurie J. Bartilson, paras. 2-4].

Ms. Bartilson sent a courier to Mr. Greene's office; however, the papers were not ready for pickup at the time Mr. Greene had stated. The courier was finally given the papers by Mr. Greene at approximately 9:00 p.m., well past the time when they could have been loaded on a plane for immediate delivery to Los Angeles. After hearing from the courier that he had received only the four papers listed above, Ms. Bartilson telephoned Mr. Greene at his office. [Id., paras. 5-7]. Mr. Greene stated to Ms. Bartilson that he did not serve any separate statements or any oppositions to the remaining motions, because they had not yet been completed. [Id., para. 7]. He further stated that he intended to complete them and file them late, to which he assumed defendants would object. [Id., para. 8].

This is merely the latest episode in plaintiffs'

"persistent pattern of abusive conduct," Chism v. National

Heritage Life Ins. Company, 637 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir.

1981), which defendants and the Court have tried in vain to

cure. The schedule set by the Court was clear and concise,

plainly designed to permit the Court to rule on pending matters

prior to the Pretrial Conference, now set for September 16,

1991. Plaintiffs' refusal to comply with this clear order, and

instead late-filing of oversized, but nonetheless <u>incomplete</u> responses to only two of the six pending motions, is inexcusable. The suggestion by their counsel that they intend to further defy this Court's order by filing additional oppositions outside of the deadlines imposed by the Court is one that this Court should not tolerate, particularly when plaintiffs <u>already sought and were granted</u> additional time in which to file the papers which were due. 2/ The language of the Ninth Circuit in dealing with a similar case which arose in this very district is hauntingly appropriate:

Chism or his attorneys continually flouted discovery rules, failed to comply with pretrial conference obligations, and repeatedly violated the local rules of court. This conduct continued even after a representation to the court that discovery would proceed expeditiously, after a clear warning that the court condemned infractions of the pretrial conference rules, and despite repeated efforts by National to secure compliance without necessity of intervention by the trial court. Plaintiff's misconduct prejudiced his opponent, violated important policies designed to insure efficiency in legal proceedings at the trial court level and persisted to the very end.

637 F.2d at 1331.

The prejudice to defendants in this case is painfully

^{2.} Defendants note that the association by the Aznarans of "new trial counsel" has done nothing to improve their ability to comply with this Court's orders. See, Chism, at 1332.

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clear. After waiting many extra weeks for a determination of their potentially dispositive motions, thanks to the machinations of plaintiffs in hiring defendants' former lawyer, they must now wait an undisclosed additional period for plaintiffs to finally complete and file their oppositions to the motions. The service of the oppositions actually done was late and defective, costing defendants extra time and expense to get the untimely and overly large papers to their counsel for response. Defendants are faced with the prospect of preparing replies without responding to plaintiffs' separate statements which, according to Mr. Greene, will still be filed .at some indefinite future date. Meanwhile, the case is moving inexorably to pretrial and trial. Defendants respectfully urge this Court to examine plaintiffs' conduct, weigh the obvious equities, and dismiss this case with prejudice as an appropriate sanction for plaintiffs' repeated and willfull violations of its orders.

Dated: August 20, 1991

Respectfully submitted,

WYLLIAM T. DRESCHER

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COOLEY, MANION, MOORE
& JONES, P.C.

Attorneys for Defendants CHURCH OF SPIRITUAL TECHNOLOGY and RELIGIOUS TECHNOLOGY CENTER

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Attorneys for Defendant AUTHOR SERVICES, INC.



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VICKI J. AZNARAN and
RICHARD N. AZNARAN,

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS'
Plaintiff(s),

EX PARTE APPLICATION

ORDER CONTINUING ALL PENDING
MOTIONS TO SEPT. 9, 1991

CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY, INC.,

Defendant(s).

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

- 1. Plaintiffs VICKI J. AZNARAN and RICHARD N. AZNARAN's (hereinafter "Plaintiffs") ex parte application for an order allowing Plaintiffs to respond to all pending motions on or before August 26, 1991 is hereby DENIED.
- 2. By its last Order, the Court set a final motion cut-off date of August 19, 1991 in this action. All remaining motions were to be limited to 35 pages in length, excluding indices and exhibits, noticed no later than August 19, 1991 and filed in a timely manner. The Court specified that no further motions will

1 be heard after that date absent a showing of good cause why the 2 motion could not have been brought sooner.

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In light of the Court's inadvertantly approving Plaintiffs' substitution of counsel and the subsequent reinstating of Ford Greene as Plaintiffs' counsel, however, the Court has determined that, in fairness to the parties, some extension of time for filing opposition and replies to already pending motions is appropriate. Therefore, although the Court does not 9 by this Order alter the finality of the August 19, 1991 date for 10 the filing of any motions in this action, the Court hereby GRANTS Plaintiffs an extension until 3:00 p.m. on August 19, 1991 to file any opposition to any pending motions in this action. The Court also hereby GRANTS Defendants an extension until 3:00 p.m. on August 26, 1991 to file any reply briefs to any pending motions in this action. All pending motions will then be continued to the September 9, 1991 hearing date in order to permit the Court to rule after all submissions have been made.

The aforementioned extensions of time apply to all pending motions, including any motions currently under submission. No further extensions of time will be granted and the parties should not construe these extensions to permit the filing of any

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motion noticed later than August 19, 1991. Counsel are hereby reminded that the 35 page limit, excluding indices and exhibits, mandated by the Local Rules apply to all submissions.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: AUQUST 9, 1991

James W Loleman

JAMES M. IDEMAN United States District Judge

DECLARATION OF LAURIE J. BARTILSON

- I, LAURIE J. BARTILSON, hereby declare and state:
- 1. I am a partner in the firm of Bowles & Moxon, which is co-counsel of record for defendants in the above-captioned case. I have personal knowledge of the matters set forth herein and, if called upon to do so, could and would competently testify thereto.
- 2. On August 19, 1991, at approximately 10:30 a.m., I called the offices of Ford Greene in San Anselmo, California. The telepone was answered by an answering machine, which played a message stating that Ford Greene had had an emergency, and would not be able to return any calls until Monday, August 19. I left a message on the machine, giving my name and telephone number, and requesting that Mr. Greene contact me concerning service of the papers which he had due to be filed that day.
- 3. At approximately 1:15 p.m. on August 19, 1991, I again called Greene's offices. This time a man answered the telephone, and offered to take a message for Ford Greene. When I asked the man for his name, he told me that he was Gerry Armstrong. I was surprised to hear this, as I knew that until recently, Mr. Armstrong had been working as a paralegal for Joseph Yanny. I explained to Mr. Armstrong that I wanted to coordinate service of the papers with Mr. Greene, and offered to have a courier pick them up from Greene's offices. Mr. Armstrong promised to relay the message.
- 4. At approximately 2:15 p.m. on August 19, 1991, Mr. Greene returned my call. I was tied up, but called him back shortly thereafter. Mr. Greene informed that the papers "were

at Kinko's" being copied, and that he had been told that they would be ready between 5:00 and 6:00. He agreed to call my offices when they were ready for pickup.

- 5. I later discovered that my San Francisco courier had already left for San Anselmo. As the drive was substantial, he decided to simply wait at Mr. Greene's office until the papers were ready,
- 6. Mr. Greene did not give the courier copies of the papers until approximately 9:00 p.m. The courier then called my offices, and listed the materials which he had been given. The quantity of papers was substantially smaller than I had expected.
- 7. At approximately 9:45 p.m., I called Mr. Greene's offices, and once again spoke with Mr. Greene. I told him that I wanted to review with him what I the courier had gotten, as it seemed incomplete. Mr. Greene interrupted me, and said, "Let me make it easier for you. Let me tell you what you don't have. You don't have any separate statements with the summary judgment oppositions, you don't have an opposition to the motion to dismiss, you don't have an opposition to the Singer motion, and you don't have an opposition to the Rule 42 motion."
- 8. I asked Mr. Greene why it was that I had not been served with these papers. He stated that I had not been served because they were not completed and had not yet been filed. He stated that he planned to continue to work on them and to file them late. He said, "I assume that you all will object to that." I told him that I thought that we would, and expressed

the view that the Court would be likely to object as well, since the deadlines were imposed by the Court.

I declare under the penalties of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed this 23rd day of August, 1991, at Los Angeles, California.

LAURIE J. BARTILSON

DECLARATION OF JOSEPH A. YANNY

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I, Joseph A. Yanny, make the following declarations from personal knowledge and could competently testify as set forth below if called upon to do so.

- 1. Declarant is a member in good standing of the California State Bar.
- 2. I am not an attorney in fact or of record in any case between Gerald Armstrong and any Church of Scientology entity, nor have I been consulted in that regard by either Scientology or Mr. Armstrong with respect to his litigation. I am informed that Mr. Armstrong has done quite well without me. I am informed that the court of appeals has recently issued an opinion on July 29, 1991 in that regard.
- 3. Mr. Armstrong has consulted me on literary matters involving questions of intellectual property. I decline to disclose the substance of that consultation further, but I will note, however, for the record, that that consultation had nothing at all to do with Scientology and had no relationship at all to anything I ever worked on for Scientology.
- 4. I have considered employing and have employed Mr. Armstrong as a paralegal from time-to-time in the past. I believe it would be inappropriate, if not illegal, to require that I not employ ex-Scientologists. Mr. Armstrong's views on Scientology should not cost him employment with my firm or elsewhere.
- 5. In addition, Mr. Armstrong is a potential witness in litigation I am contemplating against Scientology and in the <u>Aznaran</u> case. For example, Scientology has recently libeled me by

publishing materials that, among other things, falsely represent that I was found to be taking drugs and was "unable to maintain an acceptable level of performance and professional conduct." In the context of discussing the litigation, the libelous statement is made that, "Yanny proceeded to break attorney-client confidences." The litigation is described as "concerning his breach of contractual agreement." (The text will be offered at the hearing.) These claims are libelous per se. I anticipate that Mr. Armstrong may be a witness in the resulting litigation. Mr. Armstrong and the undersigned share the common problem of having been sued maliciously by the plaintiffs herein and is a prospective witness in that regard.

- Rathbun filed by plaintiffs in support of their request for injunctive relief. The declaration is essentially a fabrication. It is a false description of the conversations I had with Mr. Rathbun on that date. I address what was actually said below. At no time during those conversations did I make any "admissions" to Mr. Rathbun. I have not breached any remaining fiduciary duties, nor have I "confessed" any breaches to Reverend Rathbun. The allegations concerning Ken Rose are particularly bizarre. I have never even met Ken Rose and do not believe I have ever spoken to him. I do not know who he is or what he may doing to make himself a target. I certainly did not discuss him with Mr. Rathbun.
- 7. On the day in question, Friday, July 21, 1991, I had two discussions with Mr. Rathbun. The principal discussion took place in the courthouse cafeteria during the afternoon. Mr. Rathbun approached me and attempted to engage me in conversation. It is now

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apparent that Mr. Rathbun was attempting to initiate a conversation so that he could offer a false declaration as part of Scientology's mission to attack and destroy the undersigned.

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- 8. I also spoke with Mr. Rathbun for several minutes outside the courthouse towards the end of the day. During this brief conversation, Mr. Rathbun commented that this suit was a "grand waste of time." He sarcastically commented, "Can you afford it?" He then added that I was going to go through the same thing again. When I asked him what he meant, his response was, "You know," an obvious reference to the ordeal of past litigation. I commented to Mr. Rathbun that they were getting beaten in all of the litigation, and that this would continue, because they were criminal and that virtue does eventually triumph in the end. I also remarked that I had seen them attempt to ruin a number of lawyers previously employed by them under similar circumstances, i.e., Barry Litt, Mike Levanus, etc. As to the comments alleged in Mr. Rathbun's declaration, they simply did not occur.
- 9. Earlier in the day, Mr. Rathbun approached me in the cafeteria and engaged me in conversation. He started by remarking that I was "basically a good person" and that they could see to it that I "came out of this okay." Mr. Rathbun then tried to disavow or downplay certain criminal or inappropriate activities, such as stealing medical records and break-ins. I told him to drop the PR pitch, because I was there and knew better.
- 10. During this same conversation, Mr. Rathbun stated that I needed to accept my responsibility for certain things. Mr. Rathbun commented that, back when the relationship deteriorated, "Everything was going south on us." I responded that if he would

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look at the record he would note that I had obtained good results for them. The problem was that I insisted on exercising my professional judgment rather than blindly following their orders. When I would not go along with some of their more questionable activities or tactics, they questioned my loyalty more than the quality of legal services.

"overts" towards them. I indicated that I knew the whole point of the exercise was to ruin me. Pursuant to "tech," they had to "dead agent" me because I had disagreed with their criminal activities and knew too much about them. Accordingly, it was necessary for them to discredit me as a source of unfavorable information.

declaration on this point is simply more fabrication or distortion. I stated to Mr. Rathbun that what they had done to the Aznarans was foul play. While they were telling the Aznarans that they wanted to settle their case, in truth Scientology was poising to file lengthy and complex summary judgment motions at a time when the Aznarans were in propria persona. Scientology not only filed hundreds of pages of moving papers when the Aznarans were in proper, they would not even stipulate to extensions of time for responsive papers. Scientology was attempting to reap a windfall by default in the courts. As an officer of the courts I was compelled to test the issue of whether I could represent the Aznarans.

13. Mr. Rathbun's response was reminiscent of the "Fair Game" policy. He did not deny that they were playing dirty pool. Mr. Rathbun commented that since the Aznarans had sued Scientology,

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they deserved whatever treatment they received from Scientology. I told Mr. Rathbun that as an officer of the court I felt a duty to see to it that their dirty tricks did not bring about a miscarriage of justice. I informed Reverend Rathbun that he, too, had a duty to see to it that everyone obtained due process, and that this included the Aznarans.

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14. Mr. Rathbun remarked that I apparently expected him to "go into agreement with the universe." I told him that he did not have to go into agreement with the universe, but that he had to deal with it and should do so within the rules. I told Reverend Rathbun that despite some of his criminal attitudes, he really was basically a good person and that if he ever came to his senses he would no doubt find himself locked up in the desert for it, just like Vicki was. I told him that if such a thing should occur, to make sure he kept my telephone number in a safe place, because he would be welcome in my house as a place of refuge.

the "RICO" case referred to in Paragraph 2(a) of Mr. Rathbun's declaration. I mentioned to Mr. Rathbun that I had heard that things were not going well for them in that case. I am aware that the court has entered evidentiary sanctions for Scientology's refusal to produce documents and apparent destruction of relevant evidence. It has also come to my attention that Scientology has suffered some serious set-backs recently in that case. These are matters of public record, which are monitored by myself and others. That Scientology would consider it inappropriate for me to know such things only evidences their paranoia.

16. I am interested in such developments for several

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reasons. First, Scientology has recently defamed me again by asserting that I performed incompetently. I believe an examination of events would reveal that the RICO case went well for Scientology when I was working on it. Since my departure from the case, Scientology's position has substantially deteriorated.

17. With respect to Mr. Rathbun's comments at Paragraph 2(c), this is a false repetition of the old claim that I am somehow responsible for Bent Corydon's litigation. Mr. Corydon is a long-time critic of Scientology and author of L. Ron Hubbard: Messiah or Madman? I applaud Mr. Corydon for standing up to and exposing these idiots. Mr. Rathbun's declaration on this point is simply another fabrication. Further, the comments are somewhat strange in that it is my understanding that Mr. Corydon has recently settled his litigation with Scientology.

- 18. Contrary to the Rathbun declaration, I have not been nor have I made representation that I have been coordinating and agitating former church members to generate adverse publicity. This again evidences their propensity to see conspiracies everywhere. I certainly did not make such a claim to Mr. Rathbun.
- adversaries of the church "go away." I did not make that claim to Mr. Rathbun. Mr. Rathbun has apparently distorted our conversation into whatever false statements he feels he needs to make in order to succeed before this court and is acting in conformity with the "Fair Game" policy previously recognized by this court in, as Scientology calls it, the Yanny I litigation, and most recently by the court of appeals in the Armstrong decision, which I will supply a copy of to this court at the time of the hearing of this matter.

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"Reverend" Rathbun is a Scientologist, perceives me as an enemy, and consequently will lie, cheat, and do anything he needs to, per policy, to destroy the undersigned. I can only explain the contents of his declaration in that fashion. This court has previously dealt with his testimony and should give it as much weight now as it did then.

With respect to the Aznaran case in federal court, I properly reacted to what I perceived to be a crisis situation created by Scientology and previously documented to this court. I would have preferred not to have become involved. However, it was and is my professional opinion that as an officer of the court it was appropriate for me to have entered an appearance in that case and allow the appropriate "case-by-case" determination to be made in the appropriate court. In the alternative, I was faced with a possible miscarriage of justice occurring without the undersigned even testing the water as to whether there was anything I could do about it. It was and remains the right thing to have done under the rather unusual and perverted circumstances confronting me. The decision to test the issue was not taken lightly. I expected a motion to disqualify me; however, I also expected an opportunity to present my defenses to such a motion which, although unusual, are Among other things, there has been a substantial substantial. waiver of privilege by Scientology's attacks on and defamation of the undersigned. The Aznaran case is not substantially related to my previous work for Scientology. Unfortunately, Judge Ideman acted without hearing any arguments or proof on the issues of waiver and substantial relationship.

21. In many respects this is a tempest in a teapot. In

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addition to being seen with Gerald Armstrong, I filed an appearance in the Aznaran case. I sought an extension of time in which to respond to summary judgment motions first from opposing counsel and then from the court. I suggested to Mr. Quinn that they continue the summary judgment hearings until such time as the Aznarans' representation could be straightened out. Scientology declined that most reasonable suggestion. Accordingly, I filed motions to obtain extensions of time. Ultimately, the court revoked the substitution of attorney and reinstated Ford Greene as counsel of record. Presumably, Mr. Greene is responding to pending motions.

22. My appearance in the <u>Aznaran</u> case was so transitory that I was personally never in possession of the file. Under the circumstances, I never had an opportunity to do any work on the merits of the case. No discovery or trial preparation was done during my brief tenure as counsel of record.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California and the United States that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on July 31, 1991, at Los Angeles, California.

JOSEPH A YANNY

Declaration of Gerald alimstrong J, Gerald armstrong, declare: 1. I have been advised by attorney Joseph a yanny that he has been sued by one or more Swentslogy entities, hereinafter referred to se "the organization," for inducing me to breach a settlement agreement I entered into with the organization in December 1986. I am making this declaration to show that this allegation is in every respect 2. I received a telephone call from Mr. Yanny to my answering machine on or sbout July 10, 1991. He left a message which simply said, ce I need your help." I

called him back at which time he reiterated his request for my help and explained that because of organization machinatrois (which from been detailed in other declar-. ations by other garties), Rick - and Vicki agnaran, glaintiffs and counter-defendants, against the organization had been induced to fire their attorney, Ford Greene, and that Mr. Janny had come into the case to ensure they had legal regresentation. Mr. Fanny also engressed during this conversation some personal concerne, which will remain private and conficlential

between Mr. Yanny and me. 3. I told Mr. Janny at that time that I would help and that I would travel to for I' Angeles on July 12. Of I asked him for fine hundred.

- dollars to come my expenses. and told him he rould consider it as quickose of stock in the Gerald Armstrong Corporation (TGAC). I also courseled Mr. Jonny. st that time regarding his personal spiritual difficulties. (TGAC 15 a Colfornia Corgonation in which, although it bears my nome and I am its active office,

I sun ro stock.) 4. I did travel to Jos Angeles, did stay st Mr. Janny's home, did work in his office on July 15 and 16, and did joute and execute a declaration on July 16 giving my knowledge of the effect of the December 1986 group settlement ogreenerts on the stillity of, the. Ogranow and other inder iduals victimized by the organization to obtain proger legal regresentation. I also discussed with Mr. Yanny leterary and

(5) artistice matters, sular of the low, or a copyright ord trademark attorney, in which te par expertise. The majority of my time with Mr. Young concerned spiritual matters, on area in which I have expertise. 5. I refer this Court to my declarationi of March 15, 1990 and December 25, 1990, and the exhibits thereto. These declarstroni detail the rincumstances at the time of the December 1986 set tlement and the many instances subsequently

when I was attached or threatened by the organization in violation of the settlement ogreement. these declarations make it very clear that I consider I have a right to counter the organizations attache, to speak out ogsinat its policy of "fair gome and assoults on the basic rights of individuals, and to assist those whom I would degend on for protection ogainst the organization's legal and extra-legal might and antisocial acts. It in therefore the sy-

anization itself which induced me, if I was induced by ony human agency to do anything which the squization might consider a breach of the settlement ogreement. 6. But more than a desire to grotest. myself or right the organizations unjust acts towards me, however, & helped Mr. Yanny for the simple reason that he asked. I will do the some for anyone. The organization is sware of this fact because it received my letter of

June 21, 1991, a copy of which will accompany this declaration or Exhibit 1, and acknowledged the letter's receipt in their letter of July 3, 1991, a copy of which will accompany this declarations
or Exhibit 2. It is not only the right of all men to respond to requests for help, it is our essence. If I was induced, therefore, to help Mr. Young, or orgone lae, it was our h u Who induced me. Mr. Janny, unlike the organization, was not sware of my dedication to helping my fellow humans, did not know of my June

21, 1991 letter, so acted in innocence. 7. I do not ask for o expect a fee for my help, although generally & so not refuse whotever is given me. I know that I am sustained, completely by the Great Coordinator Who sends to me whomever the worts me to help. I therefore con not be induced by money a whatever onyone con offer me. I declare under the pain and peralty of perguing under the lows of the State of Colifornia that the foregoing is true and



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VICKI J. AZNARAN and RICHARD N. AZNARAN,) CV-88-1786-JMI (Ex)
Plaintiff(s),) ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS') EX PARTE APPLICATION)) ORDER CONTINUING ALL PENDING) MOTIONS TO SEPT. 9, 1991
v. CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY, INC.,	
choken of Scientologi, inc.,	ORDER SETTING BRIEFING SCHEDULE
Defendant(s).)) .)

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

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- 1. Plaintiffs VICKI J. AZNARAN and RICHARD N. AZNARAN's (hereinafter "Plaintiffs") ex parte application for an order allowing Plaintiffs to respond to all pending motions on or before August 26, 1991 is hereby DENIED.
- 2. By its last Order, the Court set a final motion cut-off date of August 19, 1991 in this action. All remaining motions were to be limited to 35 pages in length, excluding indices and exhibits, noticed no later than August 19, 1991 and filed in a timely manner. The Court specified that no further motions will

l be heard after that date absent a showing of good cause why the 2 motion could not have been brought sooner.

In light of the Court's inadvertantly approving Plaintiffs' substitution of counsel and the subsequent reinstating of Ford 5 Greene as Plaintiffs' counsel, however, the Court has 6 determined that, in fairness to the parties, some extension of time for filing opposition and replies to already pending motions is appropriate. Therefore, although the Court does not by this Order alter the finality of the August 19, 1991 date for 10 the filing of any motions in this action, the Court hereby 11 GRANTS Plaintiffs an extension until 3:00 p.m. on August 19, 12 | 1991 to file any opposition to any pending motions in this 13 action. The Court also hereby GRANTS Defendants an extension 14 until 3:00 p.m. on August 26, 1991 to file any reply briefs to any pending motions in this action. All pending motions will then be continued to the September 9, 1991 hearing date in order to permit the Court to rule after all submissions have been 181 made.

The aforementioned extensions of time apply to all pending 20 motions, including any motions currently under submission. further extensions of time will be granted and the parties should not construe these extensions to permit the filing of any

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motion noticed later than August 19, 1991. Counsel are hereby reminded that the 35 page limit, excluding indices and exhibits, mandated by the Local Rules apply to all submissions. IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: AUQUST 9, 1991

James W Loleman

United States District Judge